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The Conflict Between
BlackRock’s Shareholder
Activism and ERISA’s
Fiduciary Duties
Bernard S. Sharfman†
Abstract
The focus of this Article is on the agency costs that may be created
by the empty voting of investment advisers to index funds and how
they can be mitigated so as to protect the value of private employee
pension benefit plans. This Article focuses on BlackRock because it has
taken a leadership role in the leveraging of its delegated voting
authority. Therefore, the issue I address in this Article is whether the
fiduciary duties of a plan manager of an “employee pension benefit
plan,” as authorized under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), requires it to investigate BlackRock’s
shareholder activism. This indirect approach is required as the fiduciary
duties of ERISA do not generally extend to mutual funds and ETFs
and their investment advisors.
This Article takes the position that a plan manager has a fiduciary
duty, the duty of prudence, to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder
activism. This duty applies not only to BlackRock’s mutual funds or
ETFs that an ERISA plan invests in but also to those BlackRock fund
selections that it makes available to its participants and beneficiaries
in self-directed accounts.
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Given these fiduciary duties, this Article argues that if a plan man–
ager were to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism, especially
its engagement strategy, it would likely find it to be in conflict with the
manager’s fiduciary duties. Such a finding would require a plan manager
to seek out other reasonably available alternatives that are not
associated with such shareholder activism.
While the focus of this Article is on BlackRock’s delegated voting
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated
voting authority for purposes of engaging in such activism. Moreover,
the Department of Labor should provide guidance to plan managers on
when the investment products of investment advisers with delegated
voting authority need to be excluded.
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Introduction
The world is full of surprises. One of those surprises is that
BlackRock, Inc. (“BlackRock”), an investment adviser1 that primarily
markets and manages index funds to millions of passive investors
around the globe, has become a leading shareholder activist. Based on
the extremely large amount of assets it has under management,
approximately $7.3 trillion with approximately $3.5 trillion of that
being the common stock of publicly traded companies,2 its importance
as an activist cannot be overstated.
BlackRock and its major index-fund rivals Vanguard and State
Street Global Advisors (the “Big Three”), have an enormous amount
of proxy voting power. According to Bebchuk and Hirst, as of 2017
BlackRock held in its managed portfolio a 5% or more position in 488
out of the 500 common stocks that make up the S&P 500, Vanguard
had such a position in all 500 companies, and State Street Global
Advisors in 130.3 According to Fichtner, Heemskerk, and GarciaBernardo, as of March 2016 BlackRock had a 5% or more position in
about 2,000 out of the approximately 3,900 U.S. publicly listed
companies then existing, Vanguard had such a position in 1,750 such
companies, and State Street Global Advisors in 260 companies.4
Yet this voting power actually understates the size of the Big
Three’s voting influence; the reason being that they vote virtually all
of the shares they manage while other investor types, such as retail
investors, do not. For example, Brav, Cain, and Zytnick, over the time
period 2015 to 2017, found that while retail investors held
approximately 26% of the shares in their sample, they only cast a ballot
32% of the time.5 This explains Bebchuk and Hirst’s findings that while
1.

15 U.S.C. 80b–2(a)(11) (2018) (defining “Investment adviser” as a person
who “engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .”).

2.

BlackRock, Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q) 46 (Aug. 7, 2020).

3.

Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U.
L. Rev. 721, 735, tbl.4 (2019).

4.

Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 311–
12 (2017).

5.

Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder
Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting,
Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Nov. 19, 2019), https://corp
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on average the Big Three controlled 20.5% of shares of the companies
that make up the S&P 500, they cast a combined 25.4% of the proxy
votes.6 Bebchuk and Hirst also estimated that Vanguard had an average
voting influence of 11.1%, BlackRock 8.7%, and State Street 5.6%.7
Consistent with Bebchuk and Hirst, Caleb Griffin finds that while the
Big Three control approximately 20.1% of shares at the largest 250
publicly traded companies in the U.S., they cast a combined 25% of the
proxy votes.8 He further estimated that Vanguard had an average
voting influence of 10.6%, BlackRock 9.0%, and State Street 5.4%.9
What has allowed the Big Three to become such large players in
proxy voting? Basically, it is a combination of the strong investor
interest in such index funds combined with how these funds have been
traditionally managed. It begins when an individual investor or
institution (beneficial investor) decides to invest in an index mutual
fund or exchange traded fund (“ETF”) that predominately invests in
equity securities—for example, a fund that invests in equities that make
up the S&P 500. This decision usually means that the beneficial
investor is delegating its shareholder voting to the index fund, a
common industry practice which relieves the beneficial investor of
having to worry about shareholder voting. And the delegation of voting
authority does not stop there. The mutual fund or ETF will then turn
around and delegate its voting authority to the fund’s investment
adviser, the adviser that is responsible for managing the fund’s portfolio
of investments.
These standard practices, combined with the large movement of
assets into the index funds of a relatively small number of investment
advisers, has resulted in a concentration of voting power. But what is
most striking about this arrangement is that the investment advisers to
the funds have no economic interest in the underlying securities. This
“decoupling” or “unbundling” of voting interests from economic
interests in the context of shareholder voting is referred to as “empty

gov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/19/retail-shareholder-participation/ [https:
//perma.cc/6K25-ST8H].
6.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 736, tbl.5.

7.

Id.

8.

Caleb N. Griffin, Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on
Shareholder Proposals, 73 SMU L. Rev. 409, 418 tbl.1 (2020).

9.

Id. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that
the voting power and influence of a Big Three member would be amplified
if two or more of the Big Three had similar marketing and engagement
strategies. In sum, an uncoordinated wolf pack would be created.
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voting.”10—here, the empty voting of investment advisers to index
mutual funds and ETFs.11
Empty voting creates a potential misalignment between the
interests of voters (investment advisers to index mutual funds and
ETFs) and the residual risk bearers (beneficial investors that own
shares in the index mutual funds and ETFs) and therefore creates the
potential for agency costs12—more precisely, what Gilson and Gordon
would call “the agency costs of agency capitalism.”13 In the case of
investment advisers to index funds, these agency costs come in two
flavors. The first are “passive” agency costs.14 These costs refer to the
economic disincentives investment advisers to index funds have in
becoming informed about the investments they manage, including when
they vote their proxies.15 The second are “proactive” agency costs.16
These costs refer to the economic incentives investment advisers have
to leverage their delegated voting authority for their own gain.17
Moreover, BlackRock, like the other members of the Big Three, has
centralized this enormous voting authority and influence into the hands
of a small group of individuals, its investment stewardship team. This
allows BlackRock to aggregate shareholder voting across a myriad of
funds for purposes of taking advantage of economies of scale and cost
10.

Henry T. C. Hu, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The
Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency, 70 Bus. Law. 347, 355 (2015).

11.

See Bernard S. Sharfman, Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises
New Governance Issues, Colum. L. Sch.: Blue Sky Blog (July 3,
2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advi
sors-empty-voting-raises-new-governance-issues [https://perma.cc/5KLJ42M8].

12.

See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership
from Control, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 877, 884 (2010) (“The existence of
additional agency costs within the intermediary structure offers reason to
question the proposition that institutional investors can improve corporate
decision-making by more active participation in corporate governance.”).

13.

Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 889 (2013).

14.

Bernard S. Sharfman, How the SEC Can Help Mitigate the “Proactive”
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 8 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2019).

15.

See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev.
2029, 2039 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The
Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persps. 89, 95
(2017); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 889–95.

16.

Sharfman, supra note 14, at 3.

17.

Id.
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minimization. Its team is made up of forty-five professionals globally,
with twenty-two based in the U.S. (twelve are global, and ten are local),
who are, on an annual basis, responsible for the voting of tens of
thousands of proxies and engaging on various matters with the
management of hundreds of publicly traded companies.18 Therefore, at
many public companies, BlackRock’s investment stewardship team, like
its chief rivals, “may now control the fate of a shareholder or
management proposal, whether a nominated director receives a required
majority of votes to remain on the board of directors, or if a proxy
contest succeeds or fails.”19
BlackRock’s creation of an investment stewardship team also allows
it to coordinate its shareholder activism based not only on popular
corporate governance principles but also on its own company objectives.
This activism is reflected in its rhetoric disclosing the objectives of its
activism and the engagement strategy that it intends to use to achieve
its objectives, shareholder voting, and engagement with portfolio
companies. As subsequently discussed, such activism contains elements
of both passive and proactive agency costs that may be harmful to both
beneficial investors and public companies.
The focus of this Article is on the agency costs that may be created
by the empty voting of investment advisers to index funds and how
they can be mitigated so as to protect the value of private employee
pension benefit plans. This Article focuses on BlackRock because it has
taken a leadership role in the leveraging of its delegated voting
authority. Therefore, the issue I address in this Article is whether the
fiduciary duties of a plan manager of an “employee pension benefit
plan,” as authorized under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),20 requires it to investigate BlackRock’s
shareholder activism. This indirect approach is required as the fiduciary
duties of ERISA do not generally extend to mutual funds and ETFs
and their investment advisors.
A plan manager (trustees who retain investment and voting
authority or “investment managers”21 that receive such authority
through delegation by the trustees) of an “employee pension benefit

18.

Investment Stewardship Annual Report, BlackRock 25, 68 (Sept. 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual
-stewardship-report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE6U-4S2V].

19.

Sharfman, supra note 14, at 13.

20.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012)).

21.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38).
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plan”22 owes a duty of loyalty23 to participants24 and beneficiaries.25 A
plan manager also has a duty of prudence.26 This latter duty requires a
plan manager to perform a careful and impartial investigation prior to
making an investment decision. How these duties affect a plan
manager’s evaluation of an investment adviser’s shareholder activism
has been little examined in the academic literature. Yet the time is ripe
for its study because the shareholder voting power of our public
companies is now so concentrated in the hands of a small number of
investment advisers.
This Article takes the position that a plan manager’s fiduciary
duties require it to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism. These
duties apply not only to the BlackRock mutual funds or ETFs that an
ERISA plan invests in, but also to those BlackRock fund selections that
it makes available to its participants and beneficiaries in self-directed
accounts. This Article also argues that a plan manager, after investi–
gating BlackRock’s engagement strategy, could reasonably conclude
that it is financially harmful to its plan and decide to seek out
“reasonably available alternatives” 27 that are not associated with such
an engagement strategy.
Part I of this Article discusses BlackRock’s rhetoric and how it has
been used to disclose the company’s primary objective in its shareholder
activism—the marketing of its investment products to millennials—and
22.

See id. § 1002(2)(A) (“[T]he terms ‘employee pension benefit plan’ and
‘pension plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or
is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a
result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program—(i)
provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of
income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond . . . .”).

23.

See id. § 1104(a)(1) (explaining that a fiduciary must “discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries”).

24.

See id. § 1002(7) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or former
employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an
employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit
of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.”).

25.

See id. § 1002(8) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person designated by
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder”).

26.

See id. § 1104(a)(1)(B); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(a)(1)(B), 88
Stat. 829, 877.

27.

Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846,
72,848 (Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509 and 2550).
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how it plans to engage with its portfolio companies. Part II describes
BlackRock’s voting and engagement record. Part III explains the
fiduciary duties of ERISA. Part IV discusses how ERISA’s fiduciary
duties are to be applied to BlackRock’s index funds. This Part proposes
a new rule under ERISA: A plan manager, when selecting [index]
mutual funds and ETFs for direct ownership or availability to selfdirected accounts and in the general monitoring of plan’s ongoing
investment in these funds, has a fiduciary duty to investigate an
investment adviser’s [BlackRock’s] shareholder activism. Part V applies
this new rule to BlackRock’s shareholder activism.
While the focus of this paper is on BlackRock’s delegated voting
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated
voting authority for purposes of engaging in shareholder activism.
Moreover, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) should provide guidance
to plan managers on when the investment products of investment
advisers with delegated voting authority need to be excluded.

I.

BlackRock’s Rhetoric

Through its rhetoric BlackRock has revealed: 1) its primary
objective: the marketing of its investment products to millennials;
2) how that objective is going to impact its engagement strategy: a
focus on advocating for stakeholders that millennials believe are most
deserving; and 3) how shareholder voting will be used to persuade
portfolio companies that its advocacy needs to be implemented: voting
against management when management does not comply.
A.

A Focus on Stakeholders

For some time, Larry Fink (CEO of BlackRock) has been signaling
to the management of public companies and BlackRock’s competitors—
Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity, etc.—that BlackRock
was going to use its huge amount of delegated voting authority to
become one of the world’s largest shareholder activists, advocating for
all stakeholders, not just shareholders. These stakeholders include
shareholders, directors, managers, employees, independent contractors,
consultants, consumers, creditors, vendors, distributors, communities
affected by the company’s operations, federal, state, and local
governments, and society in general, when it is positively affected by
the social value created by the company or negatively affected when
the company generates third-party costs such as air or water pollution.
In Fink’s 2018 letter to CEOs, he set the stage for his stakeholder
approach:
We also see many governments failing to prepare for the future,
on issues ranging from retirement and infrastructure to auto–
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mation and worker retraining. As a result, society increasingly is
turning to the private sector and asking that companies respond
to broader societal challenges. Indeed, the public expectations of
your company have never been greater. Society is demanding that
companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. To
prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution
to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, customers, and the commun–
ities in which they operate.28

In this context, “social purpose” seems to mean something much
different than simply having the purpose of producing those goods and
services that consumers or other companies value. Fink also wants to
focus on the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders. The
reason for the latter was not explained until Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs.
B.

The Primary Objective: Marketing BlackRock’s
Investment Products to Millennials

In Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs, he explained what BlackRock’s new
focus on “social purpose” and “benefiting all stakeholders” was all
about: the marketing of its investment products to millennials, a
demographic group that is expected to inherit trillions of dollars of
wealth from its baby boomer parents.29
28.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/20
18-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/PU37-ZE8C] (emphases added)
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021).

29.

It can be argued that marketing to millennials is not BlackRock’s only
objective. Secondary objectives include BlackRock using its shareholder
activism to appease its own shareholders who are upset with BlackRock’s
management practices. For example, in 2019, Boston Trust Walden and
Mercy Investment Services submitted a shareholder proposal to BlackRock
demanding that it provide a review explaining why its climate-change
rhetoric does not correspond with how it actually votes at shareholder
meetings. See BlackRock, Vanguard Face Shareholder Rebuke over Climate
Votes, Pensions & Invs. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.pionline.com
/governance/blackrock-vanguard-face-shareholder-rebuke-over-climate-vot
es [https://perma.cc/7WMC-LEGR]. The proposal was reportedly with–
drawn after BlackRock agreed to give increased consideration to shareholder
proposals on climate change and join Climate Action 100+, an investor
group that targets its shareholder activism at fossil fuel producers and
greenhouse gas emitters. Blackrock and JP Morgan Spared ESG Voting
Proposals Following Sustainability Pushes, Responsible Inv. (Mar. 10,
2020), https://www.bostontrustwalden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
Blackrock-and-JP-Morgan-spared-ESG-voting-proposals-following-sustain
ability-pushes_.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3D3-NRQT]. Or, non-shareholder
activists who have a belief that BlackRock is creating harm. For example,
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According to BlackRock, millennials, more so than prior gener–
ations, see the primary objective of business to be the improvement of
society, not the generation of profits:30
Companies that fulfill their purpose and responsibilities to stake–
holders reap rewards over the long-term. Companies that ignore
them stumble and fail. This dynamic is becoming increasingly
apparent as the public holds companies to more exacting
standards. And it will continue to accelerate as millennials—who
today represent 35 percent of the workforce—express new
expectations of the companies they work for, buy from, and invest
in.
. . . Over the past year, we have seen some of the world’s most
skilled employees stage walkouts and participate in contentious
town halls, expressing their perspective on the importance of
corporate purpose. This phenomenon will only grow as millennials
and even younger generations occupy increasingly senior positions
in business. In a recent survey by Deloitte, millennial workers
were asked what the primary purpose of businesses should be—
63 percent more of them said “improving society” than said
“generating profit.”
In the years to come, the sentiments of these generations will
drive not only their decisions as employees but also as investors,
there is an organization called BlackRock’s Big Problem, which is a
worldwide group of NGOs and “financial advocates that are pressuring asset
managers like BlackRock” to adjust their climate practices. About,
BlackRock’s Big Problem, https://www.blackrocksbigproblem.com/
about [https://perma.cc/WJG7-CUZH] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). Finally,
BlackRock can use its shareholder activism to mitigate political pressure.
For example, five U.S. senators recently sent a letter to BlackRock
criticizing how it votes on shareholder proposals involving climate change
and political spending disclosures. While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to explore further, buckling under this pressure would appear to
violate the fiduciary duties BlackRock owes to its mutual funds and ETFs
and their beneficial investors. See Letter from Brian Schatz, U.S. Sen.,
Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Sen., Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Sen., Elizabeth
Warren, U.S. Sen. & Martin Heinrich, U.S. Sen., to Larry Fink, CEO of
Blackrock (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Letter%20to%20BlackRock%20on%202020%20proxy%20voting%20rec
ord_2020.10.08.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG25-NXDX].
30.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit,
BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/20
19-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/T2ZV-H7YJ] (last visited Mar.
27, 2021). This letter was apparently the inspiration for Michal Barzuza,
Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber’s recent article, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance,
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1243, 1246 (2020).
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with the world undergoing the largest transfer of wealth in
history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials. As wealth
shifts and investing preferences change, environmental, social,
and governance issues [ESG] will be increasingly material to
corporate valuations. This is one of the reasons why BlackRock
devotes considerable resources to improving the data and
analytics for measuring these factors, integrates them across our
entire investment platform, and engages with the companies in
which we invest on behalf of our clients to better understand your
approach to them.31

BlackRock’s focus on millennials appears to make good business
sense. Millennials will increasingly be the ones holding most of the
wealth in the U.S., making it essential for firms to start catering to
their needs and developing brand loyalty now, not later.32 In sum, by
focusing on millennials now, it appears that BlackRock hopes to
maintain or perhaps even expand its future market share of “assets
under management” (AUM).33
Consistent with its millennial objective, Fink announced in his 2020
letter to clients the launch of a large number of new ESG funds.34 Such
offerings appear to be an attempt to capitalize on the notion that
millennials believe they can do good through “stock-picking.” While
there is no evidence to suggest that such good can result from such an
activity,35 the successful marketing of such funds can do a lot to enhance
the profitability of BlackRock, as these funds will be able to charge
higher fees.

31.

Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, supra note 30 (emphases added).

32.

Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra note 30, at 1286.

33.

Id. at 1249–50.

34.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients: Sustainability as
BlackRock’s New Standard for Investing, BlackRock, https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-blackrock-client-letter
[https://perma.cc/D35A-B5ER] (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).

35.

According to Professor Alicia Munnell:
That’s preposterous to me that you have big social problems like
that [(gender equality or the prevention of global warming)], and
you think they can be solved by stock-picking . . . . And it’s really
kind of dangerous in some ways, because it makes people feel like
they’re doing something good to actually solve global warming,
and it’s really not.
Patrick Donachie, A Blue Wave May Derail DOL’s Rule on ESG in
Retirement Plans, WealthManagement.com (Oct. 28, 2020), https://
www.wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/blue-wave-may-der
ail-dols-rule-esg-retirement-plans [https://perma.cc/5JQT-R33Q].
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For example, because of the portfolio screening services that an
index provides,36 mutual funds and ETFs that track the MSCI’s KLD
400 Social Index, such as BlackRock’s iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social
ETF,37 will typically charge significantly higher fees than funds and
ETFs that track the more standardized and broadly based CRSP U.S.
Total Market Index38 or Fidelity U.S. Total Investable Market Index.39
In sum, the offering of ESG funds that yield greater profit margins is
another expected benefit of its millennial objective.
C.

BlackRock’s Engagement Strategy

In Fink’s 2020 letters to CEOs40 and clients,41 BlackRock explained
the parameters of its engagement strategy and how it would help
achieve its primary objective. First, BlackRock will be dictating its own
vision of what a public company’s (a company traded on a U.S. stock
exchange or over-the-counter) stakeholder relationships should be by
requiring its portfolio companies (virtually every public company) to
disclose data on “how each company serves its full set of stakeholders.”42
Moreover, noncompliance is not acceptable. According to Fink, “we will
be increasingly disposed to vote against management and board
directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on
sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans
underlying them.”43

36.

For a discussion of portfolio screening for purposes of creating an ESG
index fund, see Bernard S. Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38
Yale J. on Reg. Bull. 112, 120–21 (2020).

37.

iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF Fact Sheet, BlackRock (Mar. 31,
2020), https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/fact-sheet/dsi-ishares-msci
-kld-400-social-etf-fund-fact-sheet-en-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNN2-VG
QP] (identifying an expense ratio of 0.25%).

38.

Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF, Vanguard, https://investor.van
guard.com/etf/profile/fees/vti [https://perma.cc/F428-H7EY] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021) (identifying an expense ratio of 0.03%).

39.

Fidelity’s ZEROSM Total Market Index Fund, Fidelity Invs. (Jul. 3,
2020), https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fundfactsheet/316
35T708 [https://perma.cc/S6H7-CNHD] (identifying an expense ratio of
0.00%).

40.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping
of Finance, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/WN4U-G47E] (last
visited Mar. 27, 2021).

41.

Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients, supra note 34.

42.

Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs, supra note 40.

43.

Id. (emphasis added).
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These stakeholders include not only those stakeholders impacted by
climate change44 but also those who suffer from a lack of gender
equality.45 Moreover, BlackRock has recently signaled that increased
attention will be given to those stakeholders impacted by COVID-19
and Black Lives Matter46:
We have learned from our engagements that companies are
finding it challenging to balance the short-term actions needed to
mitigate the professional and personal effects of COVID-19 on
their employees, customers, and other stakeholders. Companies
are having to transition their business models to allow employees
to work from home or in a safe, socially distanced environment.
This transition also includes companies re-designing their supply
chains and operations due to impacts caused by COVID-19.
BIS [(BlackRock Investment stewardship team)] remains focused
on companies’ progress with respect to diversity. The movement
for racial equity and justice underscores the need for companies
to do better to ensure representation at all levels of the workforce,
alongside an inclusive culture in which a diverse workforce can
employ skills and expertise to full effect in driving a company’s
strategic objectives and long-term shareholder value.47

This engagement strategy, targeting for advocacy those stake–
holders who have the most appeal to millennials, is arguably a way for
BlackRock to show millennials that they have shared values. As a
result, this should encourage millennials to invest in the index funds
that BlackRock manages.

II. Putting Words into Action: BlackRock’s Voting
and Engagement Record
Besides its rhetoric, BlackRock’s shareholder activism is made up
of shareholder voting and engagement (direct or indirect commun–
ication) with the management of portfolio companies. Voting and
engagement are intertwined activities, with voting being the stick that
BlackRock can use to pressure companies to adopt their stakeholder
44.

Id.

45.

Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients, supra note 34.

46.

BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Quarterly Stewardship Report
July 2020, BlackRock 1, 4, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/liter
ature/publication/blk-qrtly-stewardship-report-q2-2020.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/ES6N-778C].

47.

Id. at 3.
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policies. Based on its second-quarter 2020 Global Quarterly Stewardship
Report (the “Report”),48 it is now clear that BlackRock’s investment
stewardship team has ramped up its shareholder activism. On a global
basis, again utilizing only around forty-five professionals, the team
accomplished the following in the second quarter of 2020:
•

Voting: Globally, “voted at more than 9,200 shareholder
meetings [(9,540 meetings)] on more than 100,000 proposals
[(103,169)]. . . . [v]oted against at least one management
proposal at 43% of shareholder meetings globally and against
management’s recommendation on 9% of all proposals.”49
Specific to North America, BlackRock voted at 3,085
shareholder meetings, voted on 27,126 proposals, voted against
at least one management proposal at 30% of the meetings, and
voted against management’s recommendation on 7% of all
proposals.50 Moreover, as what appears to be the primary way
of enforcing their engagement objectives, they voted against
board-nominated directors approximately 9% of the time
(1,751 votes against out of 19,459 total votes).51

•

Engagement: Globally, “a 22% increase in total company
engagements [(974)] compared to Q2 2019. [The team] engaged
in direct dialogue with 812 companies, interacting multiple
times with 13% of them.”52 These engagements were divided
into three themes: governance, environmental, and social.53
Under the governance theme, the top engagement topics were
board composition and effectiveness (discussed 504 times),
corporate strategy (“long-term strategic direction, how
strategy, purpose and culture are aligned, and corporate
milestones against which to assess management” discussed 383
times), and executive compensation (discussed 379 times).54
Under the environmental theme, the top engagement topics
were climate risk management (discussed 272 times) and
operational sustainability (“waste and water management,

48.

Id. at 1.

49.

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

50.

Id. at 6.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 4.

53.

Id. at 5.

54.

Id.
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packaging, product life-cycle management, product offerings,
and energy efficiency” discussed 245 times).55
Under the social theme, the top engagement topics were
human capital management (discussed 236 times; a threefold
rise).56
•

Voting and Engagement: “[I]dentified 244 companies” that
it believed were “making insufficient progress integrating
climate risk into their business models or disclosures.”57 “Of
these companies, [it] took voting action against 53, or 22%
and . . . put the remaining 191 companies ‘on watch.’”58
“Those companies that do not make significant progress” on
“integrating climate risk into their business models or
disclosures” “risk voting action against management in
2021.”59 In addition, when it came to shareholder proposals on
the environment, out of 30 votes, they voted with shareholders
20% of the time.60

III. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties
What does the law have to say about BlackRock’s shareholder
activism? For purposes of this Article, the law is ERISA and its
fiduciary duties. Justice Stephen Breyer, in his opinion in Varity Corp.
v. Howe, begins this Article’s explanation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties:
ERISA protects employee pensions and other benefits by
providing insurance (for vested pension rights, see ERISA § 4001
et seq.), specifying certain plan characteristics in detail (such as
when and how pensions vest, see §§ 201–211), and by setting forth
certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of
both pension and nonpension benefit plans. . . .
In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much
of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that
governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.
We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire
story. After all, ERISA’s standards and procedural protections
55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 4–5.

57.

Id. (emphasis added).

58.

Id.

59.

Id. (emphasis added).

60.

Id. at 7.

1255

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021
The Conflict Between BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and
ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties
partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law
of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection. And,
even with respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA
imposes, Congress “expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this
prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in
mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,”
as they “develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations
under ERISA-regulated plans.’”61

Given that fiduciary framework, this Article seeks a fact pattern
where the fiduciary duties of ERISA require a plan manager to
investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism. Please note that this
Article is not talking about the fiduciary duties of BlackRock under
ERISA. In general, as an investment adviser to mutual funds and ETFs,
it has none unless it directly manages all or part of a plan.62 Therefore,
this Article is focused on how the fiduciary duties of a plan manager
interacts with BlackRock’s shareholder activism.
A.

Duty of Loyalty

ERISA Section 3(21)(A) provides that a “person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or

61.

516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996) (citations omitted).

62.

ERISA § 3(21)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B), provides:
If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is
invested in securities issued by an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a–1 et
seq.], such investment shall not by itself cause such investment
company or such investment company’s investment adviser or
principal underwriter to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in
interest as those terms are defined in this title, except insofar as
such investment company or its investment adviser or principal
underwriter acts in connection with an employee benefit plan
covering employees of the investment company, the investment
adviser, or its principal underwriter. Nothing contained in this
subparagraph shall limit the duties imposed on such investment
company, investment adviser, or principal underwriter by any
other law.
See also Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,219, 55,234 (proposed Sept. 4, 2020) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550) (“ERISA does not govern the
management of the portfolio internal to a fund registered with the SEC,
including such fund’s exercise of its shareholder rights appurtenant to the
portfolio of stocks it holds. . . .”).
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disposition of its assets.”63 Fiduciaries include trustees64 who retain
management control over plan assets and investment managers65 who,
because of their financial expertise, are commonly delegated such
authority by the trustees (“plan managers”). These fiduciaries must go
about their work under the guidance of very strict fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care.66
Under ERISA’s duty of loyalty, a plan manager shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan “‘solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of’ benefitting them.”67
This “sole interest rule” is a codification of what is found in the common
law of trusts.68 It creates a very specific and narrow path for a plan
manager when considering an investment strategy or providing mutualfund or ETF selections for self-directed individual accounts.
According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, “the trustee [plan
manager] has a duty to the beneficiaries [and participants] not to be
influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust [ERISA plan].”69
Moreover, a “trustee [plan manager] who is influenced by his own or a
third party’s interests is disloyal, because the trustee [plan manager] is
no longer acting solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”70
In addition, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the statutory language, the fiduciary must act on behalf of the plan for
the “exclusive purpose” of:
“providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries” while
“defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” Read
in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term “benefits” in the
provision just quoted must be understood to refer to the sort of
financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who
manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust’s
beneficiaries. Cf. § 1002(2)(A) (defining “employee pension
63.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).

64.

See id. § 1105(c)(3).

65.

See id. § 1102(c)(3).

66.

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 570–71 (1985).

67.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

68.

Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 403 (2020).

69.

Id. at 400 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(1) cmt. f. (Am.
L. Inst. 2007)).

70.

Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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benefit plan” and “pension plan” to mean plans that provide em–
ployees with “retirement income” or other “deferral of income”).71

The Court provided further that “[t]he term [‘benefits’] does not
cover nonpecuniary benefits” such as promoting the goal of employee
ownership of company stock.72 Therefore, ERISA’s fiduciary duties
incorporate a mandatory “common investor purpose,”73 the pursuit of
financial benefits for the plan beneficiaries, that does not allow for the
pursuit of nonfinancial or nonmonetary benefits even if participants and
beneficiaries approve. In sum, plan managers are to be constantly
guided by the fiduciary principles of acting “solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries” and for the exclusive purpose of
providing financial benefits to them.
This fiduciary duty of loyalty is very strict and narrowly confided
to making sure that participants and beneficiaries receive the retirement
benefits that they are entitled to, period. The reason for this is
Congressional intent. Congress was obsessed with the financial
corruption in private pension plans during the 50s and 60s and wanted
to make sure a repeat did not occur.74 This corruption included the
widespread looting of union-controlled employee retirement plans.75
B.

Duty of Prudence

Under ERISA, the duty of prudence requires that a plan manager
act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum–
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims.”76 Thus, a prudent person
standard applies.

71.

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)). Such an understanding of “exclusive
purpose” makes it extremely difficult to accept David Webber’s argument
that it is permissible to use the funds of ERISA plans for purposes of
creating jobs for plan participants. See David H. Webber, The Use and
Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2106, 2126–27 (2014).

72.

Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 421.

73.

Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of
Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 983, 990 (2020).

74.

See Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1110
(1988).

75.

Id.

76.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(a)(1)(B),
88 Stat. 829, 877.
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This standard certainly applies when a plan manager selects its
investments.77 Moreover, critical to determining whether a plan
manager has met its duty of prudence is a finding that the fiduciary
has acted independently78 and impartially79 when making its investment
decisions. As a result, “[t]he duty of prudence prevents a fiduciary from
choosing an investment alternative that is financially less beneficial
than reasonably available alternatives.”80
C.

ERISA’s Duties and Shareholder Voting/Engagement

As I have previously written on this subject:
[S]ince 1988, when first presented in a formal Opinion Letter now
commonly referred to as the “Avon Letter,” it has been DOL
policy that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets also includes
managing the voting rights associated with a plan’s equity
holdings.81
In the Avon Letter, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin–
istration, the DOL department that preceded the Employee
Benefits Security Administration in the administration of
ERISA,82 stated that “[i]n general, the fiduciary act of managing

77.

Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) (“In addition,
the prudent man rule as codified in ERISA is a flexible standard: the
adequacy of a fiduciary’s investigation is to be evaluated in light of the
‘character and aims’ of the particular type of plan he serves.”) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(B)).

78.

Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A
fiduciary’s independent investigation of the merits of a particular invest–
ment is at the heart of the prudent person standard.”).

79.

Craig C. Martin, Michael A. Doornweerd, Amanda S. Amert &
Douglas A. Sondgeroth, Jenner & Block Practice Series: ERISA
Litigation Handbook (2012) (quoting Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223
F.3d 286, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) and citing Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242
F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)) (explaining that the duty of prudence requires
a plan manager to conduct a “thorough, impartial investigation”).

80.

Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848
(Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550) (emphasis
added).

81.

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Admin., Opinion Letter on
Avon Products, Inc. Employees’ Retirement Plan at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988)
[hereinafter Avon Letter].

82.

History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Emp. Benefits Sec.
Admin., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history
-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https://perma.cc/687X-KZ2G] (last visited Apr. 1,
2021) (“Until February 2003, EBSA was known as the Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration (PWBA).”).
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plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the
voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”83 This
policy has been explicitly affirmed by the DOL in 1990,84 1994,85
2008,86 2016,87 and 2018.88
Such a policy presumes that significant, not de minimis, financial
value will accrue to beneficiaries and participants if a plan
manager, in accordance with [its] fiduciary duties, properly
manages the shareholder voting rights associated with their plan’s
equity holdings.89
1.

Shareholder Voting

How shareholder voting is to be approached by a plan manager
consistent with its fiduciary duties was summarized in footnote 4 of the
Avon Letter:

83.

Avon Letter, supra note 81, at *2 (emphases added).

84.

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Admin., Opinion Letter on
Responsibilities of Plan Fiduciaries under ERISA with Respect to Voting
Proxies at *3 (Jan. 23, 1990) (“If either the plan or the investment
management contract (in the absence of a specific plan provision) expressly
precludes the investment manager from voting proxies, the responsibility
for such proxy voting would be part of the trustees’ exclusive responsibility
to manage and control the assets of the plan.”).

85.

Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (July 29, 1994) (to be codified at
29 CFR pt. 2509) (“[A] statement of proxy voting policy would be an
important part of any comprehensive statement of investment policy.”).

86.

Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed.
Reg. 61,731, 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509)
(“The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate
stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares
of stock.”).

87.

Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and
Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies
or Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879, 95,880 (Dec. 29, 2016) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (“The Department’s longstanding position is that
the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock
includes decisions on the voting of proxies . . . .”).

88.

Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp.
Benefits Sec. Admin. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01
[https://perma.cc/L9LB-2TPR].

89.

Bernard S. Sharfman, Now Is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors as
Fiduciaries under ERISA, 25 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 8 (2020).
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Section 404(a)(1) requires, among other things, that a fiduciary
of a plan act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan’s
participants and beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. To act
prudently in the voting of proxies (as well as in all other fiduciary
matters), a plan fiduciary must consider those factors which would
affect the value of the plan’s investment. Similarly, the
Department [of Labor] has construed the requirements that a
fiduciary act solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits to, participants and beneficiaries as
prohibiting a fiduciary from subordinating the interests of
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to
unrelated objectives.90

Accordingly, when a plan manager votes on behalf of an ERISA
pension plan, it must do so within the strict and narrow boundaries of
what the fiduciary duties of ERISA require. The DOL’s recently
proposed rule, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and
Shareholder Rights, is very clear on the purpose of shareholder voting:
“ERISA mandates that fiduciaries manage voting rights prudently and
for the ‘exclusive purpose’ of securing economic benefits for plan
participants and beneficiaries—which may or may not require a proxy
vote to be cast.”91
In the specific context of shareholder voting under the duty of
prudence:
[F]iduciaries must perform reasonable investigations, under–
standing that certain proposals may require a more detailed or
particularized voting analysis. Information that will better enable
fiduciaries to determine whether or how to vote proxies on
particular matters includes the cost of voting, including
opportunity costs; the type of proposal (e.g., those relating to
social or public policy agendas versus those dealing with issues
that have a direct economic impact on the investment); voting
recommendations of management; and an analysis of the
particular shareholder proponents. In the Department’s view,
fiduciaries must be prepared to articulate the anticipated
economic benefit of proxy-vote decisions in the event they decide
to vote.92

90.

Avon Letter, supra note 81, at 11 n.4 (emphasis added).

91.

Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed.
Reg. 55,219, 55,223 (proposed Sept. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2509, 2550).

92.

Id. at 55, 224 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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2.

Shareholder Engagement

DOL guidance on shareholder engagement is also clear and
unambiguous. Not surprisingly, engagement is allowed as long as it
resides within the confines of a plan manager’s fiduciary duties.
According to the DOL’s recently proposed rule on shareholder voting,
“ERISA does not permit fiduciaries, in voting proxies or exercising
other shareholder rights, to subordinate the economic interests of
participants and beneficiaries to unrelated objectives.”93 Moreover, the
DOL “has rejected a construction of ERISA . . . that would permit plan
fiduciaries to expend trust assets to promote myriad public policy
preferences, including through shareholder engagement activities, voting
proxies, or other investment policies.”94
Moreover, the duty of prudence will require a reasonable investi–
gation into the costs and benefits of any engagement activity. This
investigation must be done in order to conclude that there is “a
reasonable expectation that such activities are likely to enhance the
[economic] value of the plan’s investments after taking into account the
costs.”95
The key point is that a plan manager is allowed to engage with the
management of a portfolio company but only if the engagement
conforms to its fiduciary duties. This means that engagement must only
be utilized if there is “a reasonable expectation that such activities are
likely to enhance the [economic] value of the plan’s investments after
taking into account the costs.”96

IV. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties and Index Funds:
Issue and Rule
In the Avon Letter, the DOL was discussing shareholder voting in
the context of “the voting of proxies on plan-owned stock.”97 Back in
1988, when the letter was written, the DOL was undoubtedly referring
to the right to vote the proxies associated with the common stock of
public companies held in portfolio. As the letter says: “In general, the
fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate
stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares
of stock.”98
93.

Id. at 55,220–21 (emphasis added).

94.

Id. at 55,221 (emphasis added).

95.

Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, supra note 88.

96.

Id.

97.

Avon Letter, supra note 81, at 1.

98.

Id. (emphasis added).

1262

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021
The Conflict Between BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and
ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties

The direct ownership of corporate stock in ERISA plans is still
significant. The DOL recently reported that ERISA plans hold in
portfolio approximately $2.1 trillion of such stock.99 But over time, the
nature of stock ownership has changed dramatically, as more and more
plan assets are invested in mutual funds and ETFs.100 While the total
dollar amount of equity index funds held in ERISA plans, either directly
or through self-directed accounts, is not known, the Investment
Company Institute has reported that 401K (ERISA) plans held over $2
billion in mutual fund equities as of June 30, 2020.101
A.

The Issue

As previously discussed, when a plan manager utilizes index mutual
funds and/or ETFs for its portfolio or offers them as selections in selfdirected individual accounts, the plan has delegated away its voting
authority to the investment advisers of those funds. This delegated
voting authority does not come under the fiduciary duties of ERISA.102
Therefore, given our focus on BlackRock, the issue becomes whether
under the fact pattern of an ERISA plan investing in BlackRock’s index
funds either directly or through self-directed accounts, does the plan
manager have a fiduciary duty to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder
activism?103
B.

The Rule

Based on the rationales found in Section C of this Part, it is argued
that a plan manager must do the following: A plan manager, when
selecting [index] mutual funds and ETFs for direct ownership or
availability to self-directed accounts and in the general monitoring of
99.

Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed.
Reg. 55,219, 55,228 (Sept. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509,
2550).

100. Id. at 55,222.
101. Inv. Co. Inst., Report: The US Retirement Market, Second
Quarter 2020 (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.ici.org/info/
ret_20_q2_data.xls.
102. See text accompanying notes 68–70.
103. It is interesting to note that the DOL did not address this issue in its recent
proposed rule on proxy voting, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting
and Shareholder Rights. See supra note 91. This author believes that this
was an important omission in the proposed rule. To correct this omission,
this author in his comment letter to the DOL on this proposed rule asked
the DOL to address this issue. See Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to the
Dep’t of Labor on Its Proposed Rule, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy
Voting and Shareholder Rights, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/
EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210AB91/00057.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7HN-N3KN].
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plan’s ongoing investment in these funds, has a fiduciary duty to
investigate an investment adviser’s [BlackRock’s] shareholder activism.
This rule is to apply to all index mutual funds and ETFs that an
ERISA plan manager is considering to add, or has added, to its ERISA
plan. However, for purposes of this Article, it will only be discussed in
the context of the index funds that use BlackRock as its investment
adviser.
C.

Rationales for the Rule

Duty of Prudence Rationale: For a plan manager to adequately
complete its financial analysis of a BlackRock index fund prior to
making its investment decision, the investment adviser’s shareholder
activism must be investigated for its potential to financially harm or
benefit the plan. This activism is now an attribute of the investment
that needs to be evaluated for purposes of making the investment
decision.104
Abdication Rationale: While the voting authority of an
investment adviser to a mutual fund or ETF does not come under the
fiduciary duties of ERISA, it is doubtful that the intent of the Avon
Letter and all subsequent guidance in this regard was meant to absolve
a plan manager of any fiduciary duty associated with the shareholder
voting of shares that it now owns indirectly through its share ownership
in mutual funds and ETFs. The result would be an abdication of duties
in the context of shareholder voting. If a plan only invests in index
funds and does not have direct holdings of voting stock, this would be
a total abdication of duties.

104. As a DOL advisory opinion stated:
Section 3(21)(B) provides that a plan’s investment in a registered
investment company “shall not by itself cause such investment
company or such investment company’s investment adviser or
principal underwriter to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in
interest as those terms are defined in [Title I of ERISA], except
insofar as such investment company or its investment adviser or
principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee benefit
plan covering employees of the investment company, the
investment adviser, or its principal underwriter.”
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Advisory Opinion 200904a, at 1 (Dec. 4, 2009), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/
our-activities/resource-center/advisory-opinions/2009-04a [https://perma.
cc/J7A9-3E64]. But “ERISA’s exclusion for mutual funds is not absolute.
It does not apply to a plan fiduciary’s decision to invest plan assets in a
mutual fund.” Id. at 2.
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V. Applying the Rule to BlackRock’s
Shareholder Activism
The following investigates how BlackRock utilizes its shareholder
activism. It focuses on BlackRock’s marketing objective, as identified
in its rhetoric, and the stakeholder approach that underlies its engage–
ment strategy.
A.

BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism in a Theoretical Framework

ERISA’s fiduciary duties require a plan manager to place a value
on BlackRock’s shareholder activism so it can see how it impacts the
overall financial value of an index fund investment. Such value is
derived from its impact on the governance of the firms that are in the
index. To understand how this value can be gauged, let’s consider the
fiduciary duties of ERISA in the context of Goshen and Squire’s
“principal-cost theory.”105 Under this theory, “each firm’s optimal
governance structure minimizes total control costs, which are the sum
of principal costs and agent costs.”106 According to Goshen and Squire,
“Principal costs occur when investors exercise control (shareholders),
and agent costs occur when managers exercise control.”107 These two
category of costs are further sub-divided into “principal competence
costs, principal conflict costs, agent competence costs, and agent
conflict costs.”108 Competence costs are “the costs of honest mistakes
and of efforts to avoid such mistakes, and conflict costs as the costs of
self-seeking conduct and of efficient efforts to prevent such conduct.”109
Most importantly, “[a] governance structure that maximizes firm value
allocates control in the manner that minimizes the sum of costs across
the four categories.”110
ERISA’s fiduciary duties are neutral (without bias) to how the
minimization of total control costs is achieved. A plan manager, as part
of its investment analysis of investing in BlackRock’s index funds or
allowing them to be used in self-directed accounts, would need to
reasonably gauge the positive or negative value of shareholder activism
at all the companies that make up the fund index. Such shareholder
activism implicates the potential for increased principal competence or
105. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 770 (2017).
106. Id. (emphasis omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 784.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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conflict costs while at the same time signaling the potential for reduced
agent competence or conflict costs on a portfolio-wide basis. If this
activism reduces total control costs on a portfolio basis, then it has
value. If it increases total control costs on a portfolio basis, then it does
financial harm. If the latter is significant, then the plan manager should
seek out “reasonably available alternatives”111 that are not involved in
such activism. If it does not, then it would be supporting, through the
voting authority that it has delegated away to BlackRock, shareholder
activism that is doing harm to the value of its investment.
B.

Marketing Objective

We first look at the primary objective of BlackRock’s shareholder
activism, the marketing of its investment products to millennials. From
the perspective of BlackRock, the successful achievement of such a
marketing objective would be a great financial win for the company and
its own shareholders. It is no secret that the index-fund business, of
which BlackRock is a leader, has become cutthroat and does not appear
to be generating fees for anyone, including BlackRock. One way to
increase fees is to convince investors, such as millennials, that the world
would be a better place if they would just invest in ESG index funds.
As previously discussed, the offering of ESG funds may be significantly
more profitable for the investment adviser than lower-cost funds that
use standardized indexes.112
This marketing objective is definitely not consistent with a plan
manager’s fiduciary duties. BlackRock’s voting and engagement
behavior is being skewed in the direction of a particular subset of
beneficial and potential beneficial investors, those who fit BlackRock’s
marketing profile of a millennial, so as to enhance BlackRock’s own
profitability. Moreover, this investor group is presumed not to be
exclusively interested in the financial benefits their investments can
provide. Therefore, the marketing to millennials is not being done
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” and for the
“exclusive purpose” of providing financial benefits to beneficial
investors such as participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan.
From a theoretical perspective, BlackRock’s marketing objective
definitely indicates an increase in principal conflict costs without any
reduction in agent costs. Nevertheless, this marketing objective is not
enough, on its own, for a plan manager to decline to consider the
inclusion of BlackRock’s index funds into its plan’s portfolio. There is
still no evidence how it would impact the financial benefits of a
BlackRock index fund compared to “reasonably available alterna–
111. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846,
72,848 (Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550).
112. See supra Part I.B.
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tives.”113 Without such evidence, you cannot say that this marketing
objective has created financial harm for its investors.
C.

Engagement Strategy and Stakeholder Approach

As previously discussed, BlackRock has an engagement strategy
that focuses on benefiting various stakeholders who most appeal to
millennials. These stakeholders, at least for the time being, are those
who have been impacted by climate change, gender equality, global
supply chains and operations impacted by Covid-19, and racial
equity.114 BlackRock has the ability and willingness to enforce this
engagement strategy by threatening to vote against management on
various management and shareholder proposals. Based on its recent
shareholder voting record, it appears to do so mainly by voting against
management’s nominees for board membership.115
Clearly, this strategy is not being done “solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries” and for the “exclusive purpose” of
providing financial benefits.116 As a result, this strategy has the
potential for serious principal conflict costs. It is a red flag, suggesting
that the plan manager would be better off seeking “reasonably available
alternatives”117 that do not include this engagement strategy.
1.

A Harmful Engagement Strategy

A strong argument can also be made that BlackRock’s engagement
strategy of trying to influence the stakeholder relationships of its
portfolio companies for purposes of marketing to millennials will result
in financial harm to the beneficial investors of BlackRock’s index funds,
including the participants and beneficiaries of ERISA plans. This is the
result of stakeholder relationships being extremely complex, creating
the need for constant management, and BlackRock’s investment
stewardship team being extremely uninformed about these relation–
ships.
a.

The Complexity of Stakeholder Relationships

As I have previously written:
The management of [stakeholder] relationships is complex and is
usually placed in the hands of those who have the knowledge and
113. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,848.
114. See supra Part I.
115. See supra Part II.
116. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,846,
72,847.
117. Id. at 72,848.
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expertise to manage them: the company’s management team, up
and down the line.118
....
. . . Moreover, [stakeholder] relationships can change on a daily
basis: consumers who have ever-changing tastes or are becoming
increasingly sensitive to the negative externalities that the
company may create; competitors that introduce new products;
changing technologies; threats to global and domestic supply
chains for key components and raw materials; credit and equity
markets that require ever-changing terms; and competitive labor
markets for skilled talent. A failure to deal with these stakeholder
relationship issues in an integrated manner can lead a company
to report mediocre financial results and eventual failure.119

The following quote by Emily Winston gets to the heart of how
complex stakeholder relationships are and why it is very unusual for
shareholders to be involved in their management:
Public shareholders are not perfectly informed. Corporate
managers have access to information about their firms to which
public shareholders do not have access. Prominent in this
category of private information is information about the
corporation’s relationships with its non-shareholder stakeholders.
Corporations’ relationships with their stakeholders are governed
by agreements that are, to varying degrees, incomplete. At-will
employees and customers, in particular, have very incomplete
agreements with corporations, meaning most, if not all, terms of
agreement are not explicitly specified. Even the more specific
contracts, such as those with suppliers and creditors, will still
have unspecified terms and will need to be negotiated repeatedly
over the course of the corporation’s life. Stakeholder agreements
are therefore the subject of ongoing negotiations between firm
managers and the relevant stakeholders. Managing these
relationships is the role of a corporate manager, and it exposes
managers to vital information about those stakeholder relation–
ships to which shareholders are not privy. This information is not
reducible to metrics that can be effectively transferred to
shareholders, and public shareholders, by their nature, are not
positioned, nor do they have the expertise, to be intimately
118. Bernard S. Sharfman, Why BlackRock’s Stakeholder Approach Won’t
Work, RealClearMarkets (May 18, 2020), https://www.realclear
markets.com/articles/2020/05/18/why_blackrocks_stakeholder_approa
ch_wont_work_491618.html [https://perma.cc/5RVH-J4A7].
119. Id.
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involved in the management of other stakeholder relationships.
Thus, information asymmetries will prevent shareholders from
being effective monitors of other stakeholder interests.120

This understanding has led Professor Winston to conclude:
Even when shareholders are financially incentivized to use their
power to promote the interests of other stakeholders, they will
lack the information about stakeholder relationships necessary to
do so effectively. This asymmetry of information means that
shareholders cannot incorporate stakeholder information into
their assessment of firm value, so managing to shareholder
expectations will not maximize the value created by stakeholder
relationships.121

In sum, “while corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders
can improve firm value, shareholder oversight of these stakeholder
relationships will not succeed in having this effect.”122
b.

An Extremely Uninformed Shareholder

BlackRock gives all the indications of being an uninformed investor,
even more so than the average shareholder. As previously mentioned,
BlackRock’s investment stewardship team is only made up of forty-five
professionals covering the globe, not just the U.S. markets.123 Of the
twenty-two based in the U.S., twelve are focused globally while only
ten are exclusively focused on North America.124 But being focused on
North America means more than evaluating U.S. public companies, it
also means Canada as well. For example, take this recent quote by a
BlackRock analyst: “I cover industrials and materials in the US and
Canada. I cover approximately 800 companies in those sectors and am
responsible for the engagement and proxy voting with those firms.”125
When compared to an equity analyst who covers only five to fifteen
companies at a time,126 this is an astonishing number of companies to
cover on an annual basis. It is not hard to conclude that it is not

120. Emily Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder
Oversight, 71 Hastings L.J. 699, 705 (2020) (emphases added).
121. Id. at 699.
122. Id.
123. Investment Stewardship Annual Report, supra note 18.
124. See id.
125. Ben Ashwell, How BlackRock Connects the Dots on ESG, Corp. Sec’y (Oct.
12, 2020), https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/esg/32296/howblackrock-connects-dots-esg [https://perma.cc/Q5ZE-DJN5].
126. Griffith, supra note 73, at 1001.
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possible for an analyst covering so many companies to become informed
about any one of them.
Moreover, BlackRock and the other members of the Big Three are
in the worst possible position for becoming informed and getting
involved in the management of a public company’s stakeholder
relationships. According to law professor Charles Korsmo:
A large and growing share of institutional investment is in the
form of “passive” index funds. . . . They seek to offer a market
return and compete by offering the lowest possible fees to
individual investors. As a result, they expend little or no effort
seeking to value the firms they invest in. While these index funds
are certainly “sophisticated” investors in the sense that they
understand the central lesson of modern portfolio theory [(that it
is more efficient to have a properly diversified investment
portfolio than to try to pick stock winners using only publicly
available information)] . . . they are not “sophisticated” in the
sense of knowing anything about the firms they invest in. The
whole philosophy of index investing is that it is unnecessary to
know anything about the firms you invest in.127

According to Bebchuk and Hirst, when investment stewardship
teams from the Big Three engage with their portfolio companies, they
show zero interest in financial underperformance: “We reviewed all of
the examples of behind-the-scenes engagements described in the Big
Three Stewardship Reports. We found zero cases where engagement
was described as being motivated by financial underperformance.”128 In
the specific case of BlackRock’s investment stewardship team, given the
extremely limited resources it has to work with, why should we expect
anything more?
Think about this in terms of BlackRock’s recent focus on global
supply chains and how the coronavirus exposed their weaknesses.129
Where does BlackRock’s expertise come from when it weighs in on how
supply chains need to be restructured? This type of inquiry may sound
good to millennials who would like to see supply chains and their
associated job offerings become more domestic, and therefore make
more jobs available to them, but with BlackRock being uninformed and
not focused on the financial performance of its portfolio companies, one
must conclude that BlackRock’s investment stewardship team will not
be able to add anything of real value to this kind of decision-making.
127. Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers,
10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 55, 99 (2019) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
128. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, supra note 15, at 2096 (emphasis added).
129. BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Quarterly Stewardship Report,
supra note 46, at 3.
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Finally, it must be noted that BlackRock’s investment stewardship
team may actually reduce firm value if its shareholder activism is
successful. If BlackRock tries to pressure a company to make changes
to its stakeholder relationships that management knows are valuereducing, management may counter-propose and agree to a less
suboptimal, non-wealth-maximizing alternative in order to avoid the
uncertain outcome of BlackRock going public with its concerns. This is
an argument similar to the one made by John Matsusaka and Oguzhan
Ozbas in a recent paper on shareholder proposals submitted by
activists:
Managers have an incentive to deter proposals from activist
shareholders by adjusting corporate policy; one might conjecture
that external pressure leads them to choose policies more
appealing to other shareholders in order to reduce the electoral
prospects of activist proposals. However, we show that when
deterrence occurs, it is always by moving policy toward the
position favored by the activist, even if this reduces shareholder
wealth. Our analysis stresses the central role of voting uncertainty
in determining the value consequences of shareholder rights and
proxy access.130

The recent work of Nickolay Gantchev and Mariassunta Giannetti
supports the idea that corporate boards would simply be acting
rationally to reduce uncertainty if they were to privately agree to a less
wealth-reducing alternative. Gantchev and Giannetti found that valuedestroying shareholder proposals, typically submitted by high-volume
submitters of proposals, may actually go to a vote, receive majority
support, and be implemented by management.131 Therefore, the risk
that management may have to fully implement BlackRock’s unin–
formed recommendations, if BlackRock were to go public and receive
support from other uninformed and opportunistic shareholders, may
lead them to privately agree to less harmful arrangements.
2.

Summary of BlackRock’s Engagement Strategy

BlackRock’s engagement strategy is arguably not appropriate for
enhancing the financial benefits of its beneficial investors, including
those who are ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries. This strategy
exhibits significant principal conflict and competency costs. If
BlackRock’s investment stewardship team were truly interested in
130. John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, A Theory of Shareholder Approval
and Proposal Rights, 33 J. L. Econ. & Org. 377, 377 (2017) (emphasis
added).
131. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of
Shareholder Democracy 2 (Oct. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (http://
ssrn.com/abstract_id=3269378).
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enhancing the financial benefits provided to ERISA plan participants
and beneficiaries, it is extremely doubtful that it would do so by
becoming a third-party monitor and manager of its portfolio companies’
stakeholder relationships. Therefore, a plan manager, after investigating
BlackRock’s engagement strategy, could reasonably conclude that it is
financially harmful to its plan and decide to seek out “reasonably
available alternatives”132 that are not associated with such an
engagement strategy.
D.

Under ERISA, What Kind of Shareholder Activism and
Engagement Strategy Adds Value?

Under ERISA, the sole and exclusive focus of a plan manager is to
protect and enhance the financial benefits of a plan’s participants and
beneficiaries.133 This objective limits the types of shareholder activism
and engagement strategies that would be looked upon with favor by a
plan manager. And it appears that hedge fund activism meets this
criteria.
Hedge fund activism begins with an unregulated investment fund
investing significant resources to identify an underperforming public
company that may financially benefit from a significant change in
business strategy.134 In this identification process, the hedge fund
becomes very informed about the target company. Once that company
is identified and found acceptable for activism, the hedge fund devotes
a significant amount of funds in the accumulation of the target
company’s stock, usually around five to ten percent of the shares
outstanding.135 (Of course, given that a member of the Big Three
already owns around five to ten percent of the voting stock of many
U.S. public companies,136 the accumulation of a company’s outstanding
stock would not likely be an issue.) According to Rose and Sharfman,
“[t]he catalyst for the accumulation is a determination by the hedge
fund that the target company is currently not maximizing returns, but
that if management would implement the hedge fund’s recommended

132. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848
(Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550).
133. Id.
134. Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of Shareholder Activism and its Place in
Corporate Law, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 791, 806 (2015) [hereinafter Sharfman,
Shareholder Activism].
135. Id. at 809.
136. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, supra note 15, at 2033.
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changes, company performance would improve, the stock would
increase in value, and the hedge fund would reap excess returns.”137
The hedge fund activist then invests more resources into its
engagement strategy.138 The strategy begins with a private meeting with
the target’s board of directors and executive management.139 Then, if
necessary, it goes public with its recommended changes to increase the
price of the target’s stock.140 It can incorporate several hostile
components such as “a threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover,
lawsuit, or public campaign that is openly confrontational.”141
In sum, the hedge fund activist has an expectation that if the target
company “would change its strategies to what the hedge fund believes
is correct, then company performance will improve, the stock will
increase in value, and the hedge fund will earn excess returns on its
investment.”142 Its engagement strategy reveals itself in the advocacy
that the hedge fund uses to persuade the target company to implement
the strategic changes (private versus public, hostile or not) that it
believes will significantly increase the target’s stock price. Extensive
empirical evidence has confirmed that this type of activism has, on
average, been wealth enhancing for investors.143 Based on this empirical
evidence, it can be argued that what has occurred is that not only is
there a reduction in principal competency costs, as reflected in the
informed nature of the hedge fund activist as shareholder, but also a
reduction in agent competency costs given that the information is
willingly received and absorbed by management.
137. Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015, 1034
(2014).
138. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism, supra note 134, at 809.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Alon Brav, Wei Jang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Finance
1729, 1732 (2008).
142. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism, supra note 134, at 806.
143. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1085 (2015); Brav et al.,
supra note 141, at 1731; Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian,
Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 Rev. Derivatives
Rsch. 169, 175–78, 201 (2011); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 323,
324 (2008); Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and
Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 362, 374 (2009); April Klein & Emanuel Zur,
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private
Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 213, 217–18 (2009).
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It is possible that BlackRock or another Big Three member may
consider taking up an engagement strategy that mimics what a hedge
fund activist would use. Interestingly, this would make Bebchuk and
Hirst quite happy, as they basically have advocated for the Big Three
to invest the resources necessary for them to act like super huge hedge
fund activists.144 However, this would require a total change of a Big
Three’s business model, i.e., moving from making minimal investments
in being informed to one where huge amounts of resources are being
expended toward becoming informed about the portfolio companies
they manage and then investing even further in becoming effective in
advocating for strategic change at those companies. This change does
not seem likely, but it would be consistent with ERISA’s fiduciary
duties.

Conclusion
An ERISA plan manager cannot simply delegate away its fiduciary
duties when delegating its shareholder voting authority to BlackRock.
The plan manager’s duty of prudence requires it to investigate
BlackRock’s shareholder activism to see what financial impact it will
have on its participants and beneficiaries.
This Article argues that after an appropriate investigation, a plan
manager may find that BlackRock’s engagement strategy is not
consistent with its fiduciary duties. Therefore, a plan manager may
decide to seek out reasonably available index fund alternatives that are
not associated with such a strategy. For the BlackRock funds to become
more desirable for inclusion in a plan’s investment portfolio or be used
in self-directed accounts, it would appear that BlackRock could create
a firewall between funds that are to be included in ERISA plans and
those that are not. The former would somehow not be associated with
the current engagement strategy implemented by its investment stew–
ardship team. Or, BlackRock could simply shut down its engagement
strategy until it could implement a strategy of shareholder activism,
such as the hedge fund approach proposed by Bebchuk and Hirst, that
would not be expected to have a negative financial impact.
While the focus of this Article is on BlackRock’s delegated voting
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated
voting authority for purposes of engaging in such activism. Moreover,
the DOL should provide guidance to plan managers on when the
investment products of investment advisers with delegated voting
authority need to be excluded.

144. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, supra note 15.
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